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COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY: EXTENDING THE 1967 
OUTER SPACE TREATY TO RECONCILE U.S. AND 
CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS 
Alex B. Englehart† 
Abstract: A storm is brewing 100 kilometers above the Pacific Rim.  The early 
21st century finds the People’s Republic of China in the throes of astronomical economic 
growth, national development, and military expansion.  The United States, meanwhile, is 
staunchly determined to develop an effective missile defense system and to extend its 
military capabilities in space as it pursues its global war on terrorism.  China sees U.S. 
military space activities as a threat and, along with Russia, has pushed hard in recent 
years for a ban on all space weapons.  So far, the United States has been unwilling to 
negotiate on the subject, claiming that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—which bans 
weapons of mass destruction in space, but not other weapons—is sufficient.  Pursuing 
space weapons without coming to an understanding with the Chinese does not serve U.S. 
national security interests.  There is a better way. 
Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty should be extended in a targeted manner 
that will alleviate the worst of China’s worries—space-based kinetic kill vehicles and 
lasers, and ground-based anti-satellite weapons—while at the same time leaving the 
United States plenty of room to pursue its other military and strategic interests in space.  
By following the examples set by UNCLOS III and the ABM and SALT treaties, China, 
Russia, and the United States can amend Article IV in a way that will be acceptable to all 
sides. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
China’s recent test of an anti-satellite weapon on January 11, 2007, 
put the incipient arms race in space between the United States and China 
back into the public consciousness.1  Under the Bush Administration, the 
United States has been aggressively pursuing offensive space weapons that 
have the potential to seriously threaten China and upset the longstanding 
geopolitical equilibrium based on mutually assured destruction.2  Russia and 
others also fear the U.S. pursuit of space weapons,3 and these countries are 
likely to rally to China as the arms race progresses.  As the overall situation 
continues to deteriorate, it is becoming increasingly clear that the unbridled 
American pursuit of space weapons is a dangerous game and that the 
consequences could be very severe indeed. 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law 
& Policy Journal for their support and encouragement.  
1
  William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapons, Unnerving U.S., N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18cnd-china.html.  
2
  See id. 
3
  See Stephanie Nebehay, U.S. Blasts China Test, Sees “No Arms Race in Space”, REUTERS, Feb. 
13, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L13267247.htm. 
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The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”)4 is the major legal instrument 
dealing with weapons in space.5  Originally, it concerned mainly the United 
States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War—these were the 
only countries with space programs at the time.  But the treaty now has 
ninety-one states-parties, including all members of the United Nations 
Security Council.6  Article IV of the Treaty bans the stationing of all 
weapons of mass destruction in space,7 but says nothing about the emerging 
threats of kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and anti-satellite weapons. 
This Comment examines the incipient arms race between the United 
States and China and the current state of the Outer Space Treaty.  It argues 
that Article IV of the Treaty should be updated in order to deal with the new 
types of weapons that form the backbone of this arms race.  Part II provides 
background on the current state of space weapons technology and the 
dangerous geopolitical ramifications that are likely to result from the further 
pursuit of that technology.  Part III examines the Outer Space Treaty as it 
currently exists and demonstrates that it is dangerously outdated.  Part IV 
argues that the international community should look to the principles that 
guided it in developing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (“UNCLOS III”)8 for the law of the sea, as well as the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (“ABM Treaty”) and other Cold War era arms control treaties, 
and update the Outer Space Treaty accordingly. 
II. THE U.S. PURSUIT OF SPACE WEAPONS THREATENS CHINA AND DOES 
NOT IMPROVE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY 
The development and deployment of space weapons will cost 
enormous sums9 and ultimately lead to a much less safe and stable world.  
Kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers are very complex devices that 
                                           
4
  Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space 
Treaty]. 
5
  Union of Concerned Scientists, International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons, Feb. 
2004, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/international-legal-agreements-relevant-to-
space-weapons.html. 
6
  U.S. Department of State, Outer Space Treaty, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm (last visited 
May 5, 2007).  
7
  Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV. 
8
  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter 
UNCLOS III]. 
9
  Tim Weiner, Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May 
18, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.html.  
JANUARY 2008 COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY 135 
  
have the potential to unleash enormous firepower on ground targets, but they 
are themselves extremely vulnerable to relatively cheap and simple anti-
satellite weapons (“ASATs”).10  Moreover, the deployment of space weapons 
and further development of ASATs will upset the longstanding strategic 
logic of mutually assured destruction by significantly weakening the 
effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles (“ICBMs”) armed with 
nuclear warheads.11  If the United States chooses to go the route of 
aggressive space weapons development in spite of these dangers, it is sure to 
further alienate the rest of the world—especially Russia—and drive it into 
the arms of a welcoming China.12  In short, there are a number of very 
serious long-term consequences to the development of space weapons that 
the United States would be wise to consider before it is too late. 
A. A Number of Very Dangerous Space Weapons Are Being Developed 
A variety of space weapons are currently being tested in preparation 
for deployment over the next several years.  These weapons generally fall 
into one of two categories:  kinetic kill vehicles and directed energy 
weapons.13  Kinetic kill vehicles are conceptually straightforward—they are 
simply solid objects designed to crash into their targets.14  Because of the 
extreme velocities of objects traveling in orbit, no explosives are needed—
the force of the impact alone is enough to destroy almost any conceivable 
target on the ground.15  The major difficulty is accurate targeting.16  Kinetic 
kill vehicle launchers in orbit must be accurate to within several meters 
while traveling at 4 kilometers per second at an altitude of tens of thousands 
of kilometers—not an easy task.17  These weapons are also extremely 
expensive to deploy.18 
                                           
10
  Zhang Hui, Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, CHINA SECURITY, 
Spring 2006, at 24, 26-27, available at http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf.  See also Phillip 
Saunders et al., China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons, CENTER FOR 
NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES RESEARCH STORIES, Jul. 22, 2002, 
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm. 
11
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 26.   
12
  See generally DMITRI TRENIN, RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT 
11 (Institut français des relations internationals, Proliferation Papers, 2005),  available at 
http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/prolif_12_Trenin.pdf. 
13
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 24-25. 
14
  See id. 
15
  Michael Goldfarb, The Rods from God, THE DAILY STANDARD, Jun. 8, 2005, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/700oklkt.asp. 
16
  See id. 
17
  See id. 
18
  See Pegasus, ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTICA, http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/pegasus.htm (last 
visited May 5, 2007). 
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One of the most widely discussed possibilities for the near future is 
the so-called “rods from God.”19  These are tungsten rods twenty feet in 
length and one foot in diameter that could hit a target anywhere on earth at 
36,000 feet per second with about fifteen minutes notice.20  Such a weapon 
would obviously be extraordinarily threatening to any potential adversary, 
and there would be a huge incentive to develop methods of countering the 
threat.21  In other words, there would be a new and terrifying arms race—
each country would feel the need to develop its own weapons program in 
order not to be completely outmatched by its potential adversaries.22 
Beyond kinetic kill vehicles, various forms of space-based lasers may 
be being considered for deployment in the future.23  These could be used 
mainly to counter enemy ICBMs and other small targets, rather than to 
inflict nuclear-level destruction.24  They have the major benefit of being 
reusable—after the laser apparatus is launched into orbit, it will function for 
long periods of time without the need to replenish ammunition, as would be 
required for kinetic kill vehicles.  Additionally, they can hit their target 
within a matter of seconds, as opposed to the delay of several minutes 
involved with kinetic weapons.25  However, these types of lasers are at least 
ten years away and many engineering problems remain to be solved before 
they can become operational.26  The research and development of these 
weapons will cost many billions of dollars.27 
While space-based kinetic kill vehicles and lasers still remain to be 
deployed, ground-based “ASATs” have been operational for quite some 
time.28  These are specialized weapons that are launched from the ground 
and designed to accurately hit a targeted satellite in orbit.  The United States 
has had them since the 1980s,29 and China successfully tested one in January 
2007.30  They are much simpler and cheaper than the space-based weapons 
they are designed to counter.31  And now that space-based weapons may 
                                           
19
  Goldfarb, supra note 15. 
20
  Id. 
21
  See generally Hui, supra note 10, at 26. 
22
  Hui, supra note 10, at 26. 
23
  See Steven Lambakis, Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics, 105 HOOVER INSTITUTION POL’Y 
REV. 41 (2001), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3479337.html. 
24
  See id. 
25
  Weiner, supra note 9. 
26
  Id. 
27
  Id. 
28
  See Dwayne Day, Blunt Arrows: the Limited Utility of ASATs, SPACE REV., Jun. 6, 2005, 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1. 
29
  Id. 
30
  See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1. 
31
  Hui, supra note 10, at 26.   
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become operational, ASATs are naturally taking on a more important 
strategic role. 
B. A U.S. Deployment of These Space Weapons Will Open the Door for 
Other Countries to Do So in the Future 
The United States appears to be increasingly determined to proceed 
with the development and deployment of space weapons.  Late in 2006, 
President Bush signed a new National Space Policy that categorically rejects 
all future legal limitations on space weapons and declared that the United 
States has the right to deny access to space to those that are “hostile to U.S. 
interests.”32  One of the President’s top priorities is to “enable unhindered 
U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there.”33  This 
sounds laudable, but in an interconnected world there are sure to be 
dangerous consequences to the pursuit of entirely “unhindered” U.S. 
operations in space.  Specifically, other nations will also have a license to 
pursue “unhindered” operations in space, presenting the United States with 
grave military threats in the future.34  Even now, China sees the U.S. 
operations as a direct threat and tensions between the two countries will 
increase as the United States goes down this unilateral path.35  Ultimately, 
the current policy of simply flouting the positions of other world powers will 
come back to haunt the United States. 
While the United States is the only country in the world with the 
potential to deploy space weapons within the next two decades, China, 
Russia, and others may have the capability later in the twenty-first century.36  
Nothing lasts forever.  The United States may be the dominant economic and 
military power at this point in history, but China, at least, is catching up.  
Current projections have China reaching economic parity with the United 
States around 2050.37  As with the American development of nuclear 
weapons in the twentieth century, a robust deployment of space weapons by 
the United States will open up a Pandora’s box of unpredictable and 
frightening consequences as the twenty-first century progresses.38  China, 
                                           
32
  Marc Kaufman, Bush Sets Defense as Space Priority, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2006, at A1. 
33
  Id. 
34
  See generally, Bill Gertz, Moscow, Beijing Eye Space Weapons, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at 
A06, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070116-101320-7600r.htm. 
35
  See Hui, supra note10, at 24. 
36
  See John Pike, American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, 
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/space9811.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). 
37
  China ‘To Dwarf G7 States by 2050’, BBC NEWS, Mar. 3, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4770590.stm. 
38
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 24. 
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seething with resentment at the United States’ cavalier attitude on space 
weapons earlier in the century, will be as determined as ever to develop its 
own offensive space weapons as soon as it is able to.  Russia and eventually 
others are sure to follow.  Ultimately, it may be better for no one to have 
these weapons than for everyone to have them. 
C. If They Are Deployed, Space Weapons Will Be Inherently Vulnerable 
to Attack by Much Cheaper and Simpler Weapons—a Strategically 
Destabilizing Development 
The ASATs that already exist are quite capable of destroying the 
orbiting space-based weapons of the future.39  This is the fundamental 
problem with the strategic logic behind the development of kinetic kill 
vehicles and space-based lasers—they pack an amazing offensive punch, but 
can be destroyed extremely easily.40  As long as both China and the United 
States have ASATs only, there is strategic stability.  If either country used 
ASATs in anger against the other’s satellites, the other could retaliate in 
kind.41  On the other hand, once space-based weapons are deployed, the 
situation changes dramatically.42  As soon as a conflict begins, an adversary 
equipped with ASATs would use them to destroy the enemy’s spaced-based 
weapons (as well as other critical satellites).43  Therefore, in order to be 
effective, space-based weapons would need to be used first, in a massive 
surprise attack.44  This is extremely destabilizing logic.45  As tensions rise 
between two countries, each would have a huge incentive to strike first—one 
to use space-based weapons before they could be destroyed, the other to use 
ASATs to destroy the space-based weapons before they could be used.46  
Unlike the situation in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War of the twentieth century, 
there is no guarantee of mutually assured destruction to prevent the onset of 
conflict.47  Whoever strikes first gains an enormous advantage. 
Given this reality, spaced-based weapons are not a wise investment.48  
A robust deployment of kinetic kill vehicles alone would have costs in the 
                                           
39
  Id. at 26-27. 
40
  See generally Saunders et al., supra note 10. 
41
  Id. 
42
  Id. 
43
  Id. 
44
  Id. 
45
  Id. 
46
  Id. 
47
  See generally RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 399-441 (1973). 
48
  See Saunders et al., supra note 10. 
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hundreds of billions of dollars,49 but these weapons could be neutralized by 
ASATs costing several orders of magnitude less.50  Any country 
contemplating extensive development of these weapons should take this into 
account.51  Other weapon systems may very well cost less and be much more 
effective in the long run. 
While the United States, China, and perhaps Russia are the only 
countries on earth with any likelihood of developing space-based weapons in 
the first half of the twenty-first century,52 ASATs could easily find their way 
into the hands of rogue states and even non-state actors.  As noted, they are 
orders of magnitude less expensive than space-based weapons and do not 
require nearly the same level of technical expertise to deploy and use 
effectively.53  A terrorist organization or rogue state could destroy American 
satellites—including multi-billion dollar weapons systems—with ASATs 
costing only a few million dollars.  This threat from smaller adversaries is 
another reason to forego the extreme expense and risk involved in full-scale 
development and deployment of space-based weapons. 
D. An Effective U.S. Space Weapons Deployment Would Neutralize the 
Effectiveness of ICBMs and Create a Powerful Incentive for Nuclear 
Preemptive Strikes 
In addition to the strategic interplay between space-based weapons 
and ASATs discussed above,54 space-based weapons would have a major 
impact on the effectiveness of ICBMs,55 the mainstay weapons of the second 
half of the twentieth century.  ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads have 
been the primary guarantor of mutually assured destruction since their 
inception in the 1960s—any use of ICBMs against another country also 
equipped with them would lead to massive retaliation in kind.56  The threat 
of mutual annihilation kept the peace between the superpowers during the 
Cold War and has continued to preserve stability among powerful nations up 
to the present day.57  Even in today’s so-called “uni-polar” world, Russia and 
China maintain vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction that serve as 
                                           
49
  Weiner, supra note 9. 
50
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 32. 
51
  See generally Saunders et al., supra note 10. 
52
  See Pike, supra note 36; Saunders et al, supra note 10. 
53
  See Saunders et al., supra note 10. 
54
  See supra Part II.B. 
55
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 26. 
56
  See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441. 
57
  See id.; Hui, supra  note 10, at 26. 
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a strong deterrent to any potential adversary considering an attack.58  
Unfortunately, with the development of space-based weapons, especially 
missile interceptors, this stability would be eviscerated.59  Space-based 
interceptors would be accurate and fast enough to reliably shoot down 
ICBMs in flight.60  If one country possessed space-based interceptors, it 
would effectively neutralize the ICBMs of all other countries, allowing it to 
use its own ICBMs with relative impunity.61 
If the United States starts to deploy space-based interceptors that can 
shoot down ICBMs, China will face enormous internal pressure to at least 
consider the idea of launching a massive nuclear first strike.62  This is 
because once a robust space-based interceptor system is deployed, the 
United States would have essentially unlimited power to dictate terms to 
China on any matter it chooses—China would be at the absolute mercy of 
the United States.63  China would have a limited window of time in which to 
use its ICBMs before they became worthless in the face of orbiting 
interceptors, and it could very well feel compelled to do so in order to avoid 
the total collapse of its strategic nuclear deterrent.64 
E. Beyond the Inevitable Direct Harm to Sino-American Relations, the 
Deployment of Space Weapons Would Inflame Russia and Drive It into 
a Closer Relationship with China 
Even though Russia is now much weaker than the Soviet Union of the 
Cold War era,65 it still has thousands of ICBMs,66 and the United States 
should carefully consider the ramifications of its planned space weapons 
deployment in light of that reality.67  Russia’s opinion cannot be ignored.68  
While it may not be capable of effectively deploying space-based weapons 
in the near to mid-term, it may well have an operational ASAT capability69 
and, in any case, its ICBMs demand respect.70  Like China, Russia depends 
                                           
58
  See Hui, supra  note 10, at 26; TRENIN, supra note 12, at 7. 
59
  See Hui, supra  note 10, at 26. 
60
  Id. 
61
  See generally id. 
62
  See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441. 
63
  See Hui, supra note 10, at 26. 
64
  See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441. 
65
  See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 7. 
66
  Natural Resoures Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian ICBM Forces, 1960-2002, 
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp (last visited May 5, 2007). 
67
  See Gertz, supra note 34. 
68
  See generally TRENIN, supra note 12. 
69
  See Gertz, supra note 34. 
70
  Id. 
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on its ICBM capability to maintain its international respect.  By being able 
to threaten any potential adversary with nuclear annihilation, Russia 
maintains its strength and independence in a changing world.71  Also like 
China, Russia is understandably worried about the American pursuit of space 
weapons, which have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of 
ICBMs.72 
Russia has long been a strategic player in the space weapons arena.  In 
the late 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into 
negotiations on an ASAT ban, but the discussions fell apart before any 
agreement was reached.73  Ever since, the Soviet Union (later Russia) has 
been wary of American plans to deploy any kind of weapon in space or 
further pursue ASAT capabilities.74  The Strategic Defense Initiative under 
the Reagan administration—a predecessor to twenty-first century American 
space weapons programs—arguably hastened the collapse of the Iron 
Curtain.75  The actual deployment of satellite-based weapons in the coming 
decades is sure to inflame Russia and drive it further away from the United 
States. 
If Russia moves away from the United States, it will move towards 
China.76  Now that China has taken the geopolitical lead in opposing the 
United States—particularly with respect to space weapons development77—a 
disillusioned Russia is sure to find a strong ally in its neighbor to the east.78  
In fact, it already has.79  In 2002, Russia and China jointly submitted a 
working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to completely 
ban space weapons.80  The preamble to this proposed treaty states that “for 
the benefit of mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and 
it shall never be allowed to become a sphere of military confrontation.”81  
                                           
71
  Id. 
72
  Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime 
for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 369 (2004). 
73
  See Day, supra note 28. 
74
  See id. 
75
  See Ronald Hilton, The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Ronald Reagan, 
http://wais.stanford.edu/History/history_ussrandreagan.htm (last visited May 5, 2007). 
76
  See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11. 
77
 Hui, supra note 11, at 24. 
78
  See generally TRENIN, supra  note 12, at 11. 
79
  See ARIEL COHEN, HERITAGE FOUND, THE RUSSIA-CHINA FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION 
TREATY: A STRATEGIC SHIFT IN EURASIA? (2001), http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/ 
BG1459.cfm. 
80
  Conference on Disarmament Delegations of China and the Russian Federation, Possible Elements 
for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer 
Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (Joint Working Paper, 2002), available at 
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chnruss.htm. 
81
  Id. 
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The basic obligations proposed include “[n]ot to place in orbit around the 
Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons 
on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other 
manner” and “not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space 
objects.”82  This sweepingly broad language was too much for the United 
States, and it declined to enter any kind of negotiations on the proposal.83  
But even so, the proposal should serve as a strong warning to the United 
States of the close alignment between China and Russia on the space 
weapons issue.84  If the United States completely flouts the manifest wishes 
of China and Russia on this issue, those two countries will be driven more 
closely together—not just on space weapons, but generally.85  The United 
States would be wise to consider the significant long-term consequences of 
fortifying the Moscow-Beijing axis in this way.86  The combined 
geopolitical—and specifically, military—might of these two nations would 
pose a grave threat to U.S. interests all over the world.87  If a united Russia 
and China decided to support Iran or North Korea, the United States would 
be effectively blocked from pursuing its interests and security vis-à-vis those 
states.88  As China inevitably becomes more powerful economically and 
militarily, the United States must do its best to maintain good relations with 
Russia and prevent it from moving completely into the Chinese camp.89  
Showing a willingness to negotiate on the space weapons issue would serve 
that goal well. 
III. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IS DANGEROUSLY OUTDATED 
The best hope for averting a major conflict over space weapons in the 
future is a targeted updating of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.  The goals set 
forth in the preamble to the Treaty remain as valid today as they were forty 
years ago, but technology has changed to such an extent that the body of the 
Treaty is no longer capable of fulfilling those goals. 
                                           
82
  Id. 
83
  Eric M. Javits, U.S. Ambassador, Conference on Disarmament, Address at Conference on Future 
Security in Space (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc17.htm. 
84
  See U.S. Clashes with China, Russia over Space Arms, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 13, 2007, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17129938/. 
85
  See Cohen, supra note 79. 
86
  See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11. 
87
  Id. 
88
  See generally An Iran-Russia-China Axis?, JANE’S INFO. GROUP, Oct. 27, 2005, 
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid051027_1_n.shtml. 
89
  See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11. 
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A. The Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty—and the Noble Principles 
Behind It—Are Still Valid 
The Outer Space Treaty begins with a number of noble principles that 
are as valid today as they were in 1967: 
The States Parties to this Treaty,  
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a 
result of mans entry into outer space, 
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress 
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be 
carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the 
degree of their economic or scientific development, 
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the 
scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use 
of outer space for peaceful purposes, 
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the 
development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening 
of friendly relations between States and peoples90 
As demonstrated by the renewed vigor of NASA91 and the rapid growth of 
Chinese civilian space flight in the last decade,92 the principal signatory 
nations are certainly still “inspired by the great prospects opening up before 
mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space.”93 
It also goes without saying that these nations continue to recognize 
“the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and 
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”94  The exploration of space is 
surely the long-term destiny of humanity, and on a general level, all nations 
believe “that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for 
the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or 
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scientific development”95 and “desire to contribute to broad international 
cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration 
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”96  And the proposition “that 
such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding 
and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples” is 
self-evident.  All of these principles are as valid today as they were in 1967, 
and the United States, China, and others should continue to look to them for 
guidance as they consider revising the details of the treaty to keep up with 
the changing technological landscape of the 21st century. 
B. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty Has Not Kept Up with 
Technology 
The meat of the Outer Space Treaty was placed in Article IV:  “States 
Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any 
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass 
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner.”97  This agreement on weapons 
of mass destruction was a major accomplishment in 1967.  At that time, 
ICBMs were first being deployed and there was real fear that soon nuclear 
weapons would be stationed in space.98  The United States and the Soviet 
Union agreed that, even if stationing nuclear weapons in space were feasible, 
such a development would be very dangerous for both sides and would 
hamper the noble, peaceful uses of space that are outlined in the Treaty’s 
preamble.99  A ban would be best for both sides and for humanity at large.100 
In 1967, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit was the only 
significant military threat that either side could envision in space.101  The 
idea of precision-guided kinetic kill vehicles or laser weapons being 
effectively used in space was science fiction at the time and thus did not 
merit serious attention in the Treaty.  But in 2007, these weapons are not 
only conceivable, they are being actively pursued and some could become 
operational within the next decade.102  While perhaps not as massively 
destructive in their own right as actual nuclear weapons, these weapons have 
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the potential to be just as damaging to world peace and to humanity’s future.  
Kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs have the potential to 
seriously disrupt the effectiveness of ICBMs and thus vitiate the peace 
through mutually assured destruction that has prevailed for more than half a 
century.103  These threats are at least as serious today as the stationing of 
nuclear weapons in space was in 1967, and updating the Treaty to deal with 
them is the only way to fulfill the spirit of the Treaty in the 21st century. 
IV. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY SHOULD BE AMENDED IN A TARGETED 
MANNER  
The current Outer Space Treaty is dangerously outdated, but so far all 
proposals to update the legal regime for space weaponry have fallen on deaf 
ears.  The 2002 joint proposal by China and Russia was too blunt an 
instrument and was completely ignored by the United States.  Instead of 
simply banning all space weapons in a new treaty, Article IV of the original 
Outer Space Treaty should be updated to include certain types of kinetic kill 
vehicles, laser weapons, and ASATs, in addition to the weapons of mass 
destruction that it already expressly bans.  This is likely to be a more 
palatable option for the United States, which will still be able to pursue other 
military uses of space essential to its national security. 
A. International Law Has the Potential to Stabilize Space as It Has 
Stabilized Other Areas of International Relations 
International law has served the world well in a number of important 
contexts, most notably at sea104 and in the general field of arms control.105  
Wherever international law is applied successfully, relative anarchy turns 
into relative peace and security;106 just as all individuals benefit from the 
rule of law in a given nation, all nations benefit from the rule of law in the 
international context.  Now, in the 21st century, these lessons must be 
applied to space. 
The development of space law is analogous to the growth of the law 
of the sea from the Mare Clausum ideas of the 17th century, through the 
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“freedom of the seas” of the 19th century, to the 1982 UNCLOS III treaty.107  
Mare Clausum, or “closed seas,” involved the idea that each country had the 
right to claim as much of the ocean for itself as it could—the more powerful 
the navy, the wider the sovereignty.108  This worked reasonably well for 200 
years, but with the coming of the industrial revolution, the dominant sea 
power—Great Britain—found that its interests would be much better served 
by “freedom of the seas.”109  Britain would be better off if it could sail the 
globe unhindered by the territorial claims of other nations, even if this meant 
that it had to give up its own territorial claims to parts of the oceans where it 
had the ability to exert control by brute force.110  Britain was still the 
dominant sea power for another century after “freedom of the seas” 
supplanted Mare Clausum, and even though it did have to give up its claims 
to actual sovereignty at sea, its navy was as strong as ever and it prospered 
greatly during this period.111  Eventually, however, “freedom of the seas” 
itself became obsolete and unmanageable as more and more nations began to 
assert themselves at sea and interfere, directly or indirectly, with the freedom 
of other nations.112  The solution was international law, as embodied in the 
UNCLOS III treaty.113 
Like Britain in the 19th century with respect to the oceans, the United 
States in the 21st century sees the idea of “freedom” as the perfect legal 
regime for space.  No country “owns” space—there is no Mare Clausum in 
space—but every country has the right to use its power however it sees fit in 
order to exploit its interests there.  In every conventional sense, the United 
States is the dominant world power of the early 21st century.  But 
unfortunately, as was demonstrated on September 11, 2001, conventional 
power does not guarantee security in today’s world.  This vulnerability is 
even more apparent in space.  While the United States is indeed capable of 
unilaterally extending its military presence into space via the deployment of 
satellite-based weapons, these multi-billion dollar devices are inherently 
vulnerable to attack from relatively cheap and unsophisticated ASATs based 
on Earth.  A determined enemy would be able to cripple any potential United 
States space weapon systems, and an ability to cripple satellite-based 
weapons implies an ability to cripple any other satellites—including military 
reconnaissance satellites currently in use by the United States.  Before 
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opening this Pandora’s box of satellite-based weapons, the United States 
should consider the downsides of discarding the “gentleman’s agreement” 
against space weaponization that has prevailed for decades.114 
Instead, the United States should advocate adopting a UNCLOS III-
type treaty for space that would provide a detailed legal regime protecting 
the interests of all nations in space.115  Even though this would circumscribe 
the United States’ freedom of action in space by, inter alia, putting strict 
limits on the weaponization of space, the United States would be better 
served overall.  Its other satellite systems (including non-weaponized 
military support satellites) would be protected by limits on ASATs, and it 
would not have to bear the expense and insecurity inherent in an arms race 
in space.  Just as “freedom of the seas” became obsolete in the 20th century 
when states saw that unilateral exertions of power to protect their interests at 
sea caused unnecessary expense and insecurity, “freedom of space” is an 
obsolete concept that should be reigned in by international law.  All 
nations—and humanity at large—will be better off. 
Unfortunately, under the Bush administration, the United States seems 
firmly committed to “freedom of space”—it sees no need to consider other 
possibilities.116  For the last several years, the United States has pursued 
space weapons technology in the face of opposition from the rest of the 
world.117  The justifications for these space weapons programs usually come 
back to national security, but commercial interests in space for the United 
States and its citizens are also implicated.118  As with other aspects of United 
States foreign policy in the last several years, the American position on 
space weapons has been characterized by a distinct unwillingness to 
compromise with other nations.  In a major speech to the Conference on 
Disarmament, the U.S. representative stated that “the commitment of the 
United States to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations, for 
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humanity, is clear.  But the peaceful 
exploration and use of space obviously does not rule out activities in pursuit 
of national security goals.”119  The United States sets its national security 
goals, and pursues them unilaterally—it has so far been unwilling to 
consider all of the manifold international ramifications of its policies.  The 
space weapons debate has been simmering since the 1970s, but only since 
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the early 21st century has it reached crisis proportions—not only because of 
rapidly advancing technology, but also because of American domestic 
politics.120 
B. The UNCLOS III Treaty Is an Excellent Recent Example of the Power 
of International Law to Stabilize Relations Among Nations 
The 1982 UNCLOS III Treaty revolutionized ocean law, and now that 
space is becoming more and more heavily used, it is time to consider 
revolutionizing space law as well.  However, the UNCLOS III Treaty is 
extraordinarily lengthy and detailed—it took several years to fully draft.121  
The issues in space are not nearly as complex and varied as the maritime law 
issues covered in UNCLOS III.  In fact, if Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty is simply updated to deal with kinetic kill vehicles, lasers, and 
ASATs, that will be enough to have a comparable effect on peace and 
stability in space. 
The preamble to the UNCLOS III Treaty is remarkably similar to that 
of the Outer Space Treaty.  It begins by affirming that “the States Parties to 
this Convention . . . [are] aware of the historic significance of this 
Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice 
and progress for all peoples of the world.”122  This is the same type of 
magnanimous language found in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty, 
and shows that noble humanitarian principles are at the heart of both treaties.  
The UNCLOS III preamble goes on to say that the parties believe: 
[T]hat the codification and progressive development of the law 
of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the 
strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly 
relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of 
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and 
social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance 
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set 
forth in the Charter.123 
This again shows the similarity between the noble principles of the 
UNCLOS III Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty.  Both treaties are designed 
to harmonize the interactions of diverse parties in vast open areas that are 
owned by no one. 
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Even though the UNCLOS III Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty 
share the same noble goals, the UNCLOS III Treaty is far ahead of the Outer 
Space Treaty in its level of detail.  For one thing, the UNCLOS III Treaty is 
over 200 pages long, while the Outer Space Treaty is less than ten pages 
long.124  This is understandable to some extent—because humans have 
obviously been exploring the seas much longer than they have been 
exploring space, more rules need to be written in order to cover the more 
varied interactions that go on at sea.  UNCLOS III also took many years to 
put together and implement.  The problems facing the international 
community in space are simpler, but more pressing, and should therefore be 
dealt with in a more straightforward and faster way. 
It is unlikely that a treaty on the scale of UNCLOS III will be needed 
for space any time soon.  But some of the fundamental principles of 
UNCLOS III can and should be adapted to the space context and 
incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty.  Specifically, the “freedom of 
space” idea that largely prevails under current international law should be 
reigned in to some extent, in the same manner that “freedom of the seas” has 
been reigned in by UNCLOS III.125  At a general level, this is the way to deal 
with the most pressing issues in space—namely, the impending deployment 
of kinetic kill vehicles and lasers, and the continued development and testing 
of ASATs. 
C. While UNCLOS III Is a Good Example to Follow on a General Level, 
an Amended Outer Space Treaty Should in Its Details Resemble the 
Arms Control Treaties of the Cold War 
The arms control treaties of the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union—particularly the ABM Treaty126 and the Interim 
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (“SALT Treaties”)127—were instrumental in 
reducing tensions and mitigating the scale of the continuous arms race 
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between the two superpowers.128  Today, the United States, China, and 
Russia should look to this past experience as a guide to the potential benefits 
of constructively updating the Outer Space Treaty.  The United States and 
China are at a crossroads—they can either throw themselves into a 
destabilizing arms race involving space-based weapons and ASATs, or they 
can come to the table and rethink the aging Outer Space Treaty.  The 
consequences of the former could be catastrophic, but they will in any case 
be very expensive.  The latter option, however, would lead to increased 
stability and understanding between the two nations and to a better, more 
peaceful world. 
The ABM Treaty, which was in effect from 1972 to 2002, serves as an 
excellent model for what should be done with the Outer Space Treaty.  The 
ABM Treaty provides a very detailed description of the types of weapons it 
is designed to affect: 
For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to 
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight 
trajectory, currently consisting of:  (a) ABM interceptor 
missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and 
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode; 
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and 
deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM 
radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM 
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.129 
This is exactly the sort of detailed weapons definition that should be done 
for the Outer Space Treaty.  Both sides should agree on specific definitions 
of kinetic kill vehicles, space-based laser systems, and ASATs, and spell out 
those definitions in the text of an updated Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty.  The ABM Treaty lasted from 1972 to the end of the Cold War, and 
then for another decade.130  Without it, both the United States and the Soviet 
Union would have been forced into a destabilizing and expensive arms race 
that could have had tragic consequences. 
The fact that the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty after 
thirty years of adherence does not detract from the enormous benefits 
gleaned by all sides during the time the treaty was in force.  The ABM 
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Treaty was ideally suited to the Cold War, and even though it was 
superceded by events during the decade following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, it served its original purpose well.131  The United States and China 
should look to the ABM Treaty as a shining example of the benefits of arms 
control and amend the Outer Space Treaty in accordance with that example. 
The principles behind other Cold War arms control treaties are also 
highly relevant to the current standoff between the United States and China 
over space weapons.  The SALT treaty recognizes in its preamble that 
nuclear war would be disastrous for both sides and that limiting the weapons 
that could take part in or instigate such a conflict is a good idea for both 
sides.132  The Parties to the SALT II Treaty were “conscious that nuclear war 
would have devastating consequences for all mankind” and “convinced that 
the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this 
Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties, 
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen 
international peace and security.”133  These very same ideas militate in favor 
of adopting amendments to the Outer Space Treaty that would ban 
destabilizing kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs.  With a 
new geopolitical dynamic and rapidly advancing technology, the Cold War 
limits on ICBMs and the current Outer Space Treaty’s ban solely of weapons 
of mass destruction in space are no longer enough to protect the peace and 
security of humanity in the 21st century. 
D. Specifically, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty Should Be Amended 
in a Targeted Manner to Address the Emerging Threats of Kinetic Kill 
Vehicles, Space-Based Lasers, and ASATs 
It will not take much to effectively update the Outer Space Treaty to 
deal with emerging threats related to the development and deployment of 
space weapons and ASATs.  As discussed above,134 the relevant portion of 
Article IV of the Treaty currently reads “States Parties to the Treaty 
undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear 
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such 
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weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any 
other manner.”135  It should be updated to read: 
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit 
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons, any 
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, kinetic kill 
vehicles, or directed energy weapons, install such weapons on 
celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space in any 
other manner, or attack objects in outer space with weapons 
based on Earth. 
Put simply, Article IV of the Treaty must be updated to ban not only 
weapons of mass destruction—as it currently does—but also kinetic kill 
vehicles, space-based laser weapons, and ASATs. 
These simple changes would make a world of difference, and could 
prevent catastrophe.  In any case, they will save all sides the enormous 
trouble and expense that would be involved in a full-fledged arms race in 
space.  Eventually the legal regime in space will need a more complete 
overhaul along the lines of UNCLOS III—by the 22nd century, humanity’s 
use of space could easily be as common and complex as its use of the oceans 
is today—but in the near to mid-term, amending Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty in the manner described would be enough to avert the worst 
dangers.  In any case, as discussed below,136 it is the option with the most 
realistic chance for success. 
If the United States continues to refuse to negotiate an extension to the 
Outer Space Treaty, the geopolitical standoff with China will become more 
and more severe as the 21st century progresses.  China’s bold test of an 
ASAT in January 2007 demonstrates that it is not cowed by the current U.S. 
technological superiority in space, and that it is able and willing to continue 
developing its own weapons.  It will have no incentive to slow down or halt 
development of these weapons until the United States comes to the 
negotiating table to discuss limiting its own weapons.137  While it might be 
possible for both sides to reach a sort of de facto agreement on limiting 
space weapons, a written document—specifically the proposed amendment 
to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty—is preferable because it will 
provide more certainty, and therefore more security overall.138 
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E. Because This Proposed Amendment Meets the Needs of All Sides, the 
United States and China Are Likely to Agree to It 
Ultimately, this simple proposed amendment to Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty is likely to be accepted by both the United States and China.  
The critical thing for the United States is that such a change will not hamper 
its ability to effectively develop and deploy the types of military support 
satellites that it currently uses and plans to use in the future.139  For China, 
such a change to the Outer Space Treaty would have almost the same effect 
on its security as the ban on “all types of weapons” that it is currently 
proposing140—all major offensive space weapons would be banned. 
The United States has recently reaffirmed its unequivocal support for 
the current Outer Space Treaty.141  Eric M. Javits proclaimed—in reference 
to arms control treaties affecting space—that “most important . . . is the 
Outer Space Treaty, to which the United States remains firmly 
committed.”142  In order to appear firmly committed to international law in 
space, the United States continues to make statements such as this, where it 
reaffirms its complete commitment to past treaties.143  The problem, 
however, is that space weapons technology is advancing rapidly, and a firm 
commitment to uphold the letter of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is not 
enough to uphold the spirit of the treaty in the 21st century.  Throughout his 
speech, Mr. Javits references the bold principles set forth in the preamble to 
Outer Space Treaty, discussed extensively above,144 and reaffirms 
unequivocal support for those principles.145  If such proclamations are true, 
the United States ought to be willing to sit down and discuss modest 
extensions to the Treaty in order to allow it to keep up with the times.  A 
simple proposal to extend Article IV of the Treaty in the very targeted 
manner advocated here could very well meet with a receptive response. 
Some conservatives in the United States have argued strongly for the 
further development of space weapons.146  They claim that “a powerful and 
influential United States is good for world peace, stability, and enforcing the 
rule of law internationally,”147 and that therefore American space weapons 
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development will actually serve to increase global stability, rather than 
decrease it.148  This argument seems to assume that the United States is so 
much more powerful than all other nations that it does not really need to 
worry about how they will react to a space weapons deployment—if China 
and Russia resent American military action in space, they will need to keep 
their opinions to themselves due to fear of overwhelming American military 
superiority.  However, as has been discussed above,149 the deployment of 
space weapons will not provide this sought-after military superiority—
ASATs will still pose a serious threat to the much more complicated and 
expensive space weapons being considered for deployment.  Moreover, 
China, Russia, and others are unlikely to submit so easily to American 
power, no matter how advanced the available weaponry.150 
International law is the better solution.  As has been demonstrated by 
numerous successful arms control treaties in the past—the original Outer 
Space Treaty, the SALT treaty, and the ABM Treaty for three decades—
international law, while not perfect by any means, can often be successful in 
averting destabilizing arms races.  The United States must of course remain 
somewhat cautious—it should not entirely dismantle its research and 
development of future space weapons—but at the same time it should not 
cynically refuse all negotiation simply because of the potential for its 
strategic adversaries to act in bad faith. 
China and Russia have been pushing very hard in recent years for 
negotiations on the space weapons issue, and they have given the United 
States no reason to doubt their sincerity.  The 2002 working paper jointly 
submitted by the two countries to the Conference on Disarmament called 
“not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of 
weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station 
such weapons in outer space in any other manner” and “not to resort to the 
threat or use of force against outer space objects.”151  This language was too 
broad and sweeping, because instead of proposing to ban only the specific 
types of offensive weapons currently being planned for deployment in the 
next few decades—kinetic kill vehicles and lasers—it simply proposes to 
ban “all types of weapons.”  China and Russia almost certainly understood 
that such a comprehensive ban on all space weapons would be unacceptable 
to the United States, which has already invested heavily in various types of 
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military support satellites152 that could arguably fall within such a broad 
prohibition.  China and Russia mainly want to avoid the major impending 
threats posed by kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers—they are not 
nearly as concerned about U.S. military support satellites.153  It is therefore 
very likely that this general language was intended only to be a starting point 
for negotiations, and not by any means the “final offer” from the two 
countries. 
A ban on “all types of weapons” is a complete non-starter to the 
United States because it has already invested significantly in various military 
support satellites that could technically fall within that language, and it 
would be unwilling to turn back the clock in favor of its potential 
adversaries.  But banning only kinetic kill vehicles and space-based laser 
weapons (and ASATs) through the amendment to Article IV of the Outer 
Space Treaty proposed above would be a very different matter.  If the 
language in the amended treaty is made sufficiently clear so that only these 
weapons, and not any other types of satellites, are banned, the United States 
is much more likely to at least come to the table and discuss amending the 
Treaty.  Also, a simple amendment to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty—
which has been in effect since 1967 and has never been the subject of 
significant controversy in the interim—might be easier to swallow than an 
entirely new treaty.  On a visceral level, the idea of adopting a new treaty 
based on the China-Russia joint paper might be unpalatable to the United 
States in a way that amending the current treaty would not be.  The Outer 
Space Treaty must simply be updated to keep pace with changing 
technology—an eminently reasonable proposition. 
The actual implementation of this proposed amendment to Article IV 
of the Outer Space Treaty would be relatively straightforward.  A ban on 
actual space weapons—kinetic kill vehicles and lasers—would be easy to 
implement since these weapons have yet to be deployed at all.  A ban on the 
use of ASATs would be a bit more difficult because these weapons are 
already operational.  However, both sides realize that ASATs are extremely 
destabilizing from a strategic point of view.  Additionally, since ASATs 
threaten all satellites—not just actual space weapons—they have the 
potential to disrupt all sorts of vital infrastructure.  Banning them would be 
to everyone’s benefit, and would be no more difficult to implement than the 
reductions in ICBM inventory required under SALT.  If the international 
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community can muster the will to amend Article IV of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the implementation of that amendment will be reasonably painless. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The space weapons currently under development are extremely 
complex and extremely expensive devices.  They are inherently vulnerable 
to asymmetrical attacks by much cheaper and less complex ASATs, and the 
strategic interplay between them, ASATs, and ICBMs will greatly increase 
geopolitical instability between the United States and China.  Space weapons 
are also sure to inflame Russia and others and drive them into the welcoming 
arms of China.  The long-term consequences for the United States of a lack 
of law in this area could be quite serious—China, at least, is likely to reach 
economic parity with the United States later in the century, and by that time 
it will have its own offensive space weapons capability. 
The solution to this problem is to update Article IV of the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty to cover these new offensive space weapons.  As long as it is 
made perfectly clear in the treaty language that the changes affect only these 
new weapons—kinetic kill vehicles, lasers, and ASATs—and not any other 
sorts of military satellites being used by the United States, the United States 
would have good reason to come to the table and negotiate such an 
amendment.  China and Russia have been pushing for such negotiations for a 
long time, but their insistence thus far on broad, sweeping treaty language—
and, in fact, an entirely new treaty, as opposed to a simple amendment to the 
Outer Space Treaty—has kept the United States from even beginning 
negotiations.  A compromise is in order. 
